In this chapter we argue that South Africa's premier city, Johannesburg, has undergone a massive reconfiguration of its social geography since the demise of formal apartheid. Using census data and geographic information systems (GIS), we present evidence that this spatial transformation has been driven by a process of residential deracialization but one that has taken place within narrow class bands. Indeed, we show that change has been marked by a new process of middle-class formation that has specifically taken the form of what we call middle-class enclavization. We show moreover that this process of enclavization is marked by internal fragmentation with the increasing spatial compartmentalization of different fractions of the middle class. These findings in turn support broader arguments in the literature that emphasize the strategic practices, 
including the centrality of residential location, through which upper middle-class privilege is preserved.
As one drives north on Johannesburg's M1 motorway passing the city center and into what are known as the northern suburbs, the massive spatial transformation of the city's social geography is immediately revealed. Just past the strip of leafy neighborhoods at the northern edge of the Central Business District (CBD) that have traditionally housed Johannesburg's bourgeoisie, one enters a more modern landscape of large mall complexes and housing developments that have been growing rapidly since the 1970s. These new and generally quite exclusive residential areas are clustered around Sandton, a self-contained business center complete with five-star hotels, corporate headquarters, and a high-security luxury mall rendered in an Italian Renaissance theme. Home to the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), which moved from the CBD in 1994, Sandton has grown as rapidly as the CBD had declined. Continuing on past Sandton's sharply profiled skyline, it is possible to miss the township of Alexandra, the one area of concentrated (black) poverty in the otherwise immaculate enclave of middleclass prosperity that envelops the M1 through Sandton and beyond. And what one finds beyond Sandton is in some ways even more startling. In an expanse that runs all the way to an area known as Midrand, a landscape that was only recently gently rolling pastures and still features the occasional farm but is now dominated by a series of seemingly endless low-lying compounds that enclose shopping areas, residential estates, and business clusters. The pace of change has been so dizzying that Johannesburg is now possibly the most sprawled city in the world AU :5 . 1 But what does this spatial transformation tell us more generally about postapartheid South Africa? In this chapter we argue that the transformation of the northern areas of the city is an integral part of a larger process of post-Fordist class restructuring. Specifically, using census data and geographic information systems (GIS), we present evidence that this spatial transformation has been driven by a new process of middle-class formation that has specifically taken the form of what we call middle-class enclavization. We show moreover that this process of enclavization is marked by internal fragmentation with the increasing spatial compartmentalization of different fractions of the middle class. In presenting this evidence we also try to develop some broader claims about the spatial dimensions of socioeconomic transformation in postapartheid South Africa.
On the one hand, we argue that South Africa's premiere city and the gateway city to Southern Africa has undergone a massive reconfiguration of its social geography that is a result of both economic transformation and the demise of formal apartheid. On the other hand, drawing on census data from 1996 and 2001 we show that even as the class structure has been transformed, when it comes to the overall pattern of social inequality Johannesburg gives full expression to the old adage that the more things change the more they stay the same. Though the spatial logic of the apartheid city began to dissolve well before the end of apartheid, residential deracialization has clearly accelerated since the removal of the formal racial zoning that was the central organizing principle of the apartheid regime. But as we shall see, deracialization has taken place within narrow class bands, and in class terms Johannesburg is as spatially divided as it has ever been. So how does one reconcile the observable change with the clear evidence of the social inertia of apartheid? The answer, as we shall see, is that on the whole, middle-class privilege has largely been preserved and even fortified, both literally and figuratively. But, it has done so through a very dynamic process of internal differentiation that has distinct spatial characteristics.
MIDDLE-CLASS FORMATION AND RESIDENTIAL CAPITAL
Theoretical debates about the definition of the middle class are legion. 2 Our concern here is less about getting the category right than about capturing key dynamics of class restructuring at a critical historical juncture. Postapartheid South Africa presents a unique lens for capturing the dynamics of middle-class formation in the Global South AU :6 . Theoretically, we work from the premise that thinking about class should be focused on actual processes of formation. If much of the literature has been trapped at either end of Marx's famous dichotomy of class in itself (structurally defined) and for itself (as politically self-aware), we argue, following recent developments in class theory, for a focus on the practice of class (Bourdieu, 1984 (Bourdieu, , 1985 Savage, Barlow, Dickens, & Fielding, 1992) , a focus that calls for examining the various mechanisms and strategies through which class boundaries are made, adapted, and reproduced. In other words, rather than try to understand how a class is structured in some fundamental way, or how it represents itself, we are interested in how class is made through itself. This approach is especially well suited to the context of developing societies, where patterns of class formation are highly fluid and do not necessarily conform to patterns of class formation associated with first-generation industrializers (Fernandes & Heller, 2006) .
In the class practices or class reproduction literature, class formation is understood as a dynamic process of asset accumulation and combination. Following Wright's original contribution (1985) and drawing on Bourdieu and Savage et al. (1992) , we argue that classes are constituted of bundles of organizational, economic, and cultural/educational assets. A framework that focuses on how assets are actively reproduced is especially useful in understanding middle-class formation. Definitional disputes aside, there is a broad consensus that the status or material well-being of the middle class is not derived primarily from property (the bourgeoisie) but rather from other power-conferring resources such as organizational authority or possession of valued skills that are either embodied (cultural capital) or institutionalized (educational capital in the form of credentials).
3 A critical difference between the bourgeoisie and the middle class is that if property is an asset that is by definition readily stored and transmitted, organizational assets and cultural/educational capital have to be converted into wealth. Middleclass practices are thus centrally about securing returns to organizational assets and educational capital. Given the central role that the state has played in many late developing economies, securing returns or scarcity rents to organizational assets (the managerial class) or educational assets (the professional class) has played a particularly large role in class formation AU :7 (Bardhan, 1983) . The transition to a post-Fordist economy more generally has only accentuated the premium placed on organization and information. This is the sense in which Bourdieu (1984) argues that under postindustrial capitalism, class struggle is increasingly about classification struggles, that is, struggles over the rates of return to various capitals.
A comprehensive approach to understanding middle-class practices would require fine-grained qualitative data as well as a range of aggregate data. In this chapter we limit our analysis to the spatial dimension of middle-class formation. There is a long tradition among urban sociologists and geographers of exploring the spatial dimensions of class power (Castells, 1996; Harvey, 1985) . This tradition, which has tended to emphasize the role that capital plays in the making of the urban spatial form, can be integrated with theories of class reproduction that also take into account the social and cultural dimensions of class action. Residential spatial patterns are a key link between these two perspectives insofar as they are both driven by patterns of investment and are also a critical constitutive element of class. Not only is housing ''a major marker of class'' in itself (Nijman, 2006) , but residential location also shapes access to cultural capital, social networks, and highly differentiated public and private services. In other words, different residential locations bring different social, economic, cultural, and even political returns. Indeed, as sociologists have long argued, even when controlling for income, education, and race, space by itself is an important causal determinant of intergenerational mobility (Massey & Denton, 1993) . In this sense then, residence is not a choice. It is a strategy. Residential location is about storing and amplifying existing assets by embedding them in a particular spatially bounded social setting that carries with it access to valuable social and cultural networks and access to useful infrastructure (libraries, roads) and institutions (schools). As economists might put it, residential choice is lumpy, in that choices about home, work, social life, schooling, and status all get lumped together. Recent work by sociologists and geographers has underscored this point (Robson & Butler, 1995 AU :8 ; Nijman, 2006; Savage et al., 1992) . Savage and his colleagues (1992) , who have produced seminal work on middle-class formation in England, point out that ''one's residence is a crucial, possibly the crucial, identifier of who you are. The sorting processes by which people chose to live in certain places and others leave is at the heart of contemporary battles over social distinction'' (cited in Atkinson, 2006, p. 822) . A case in point is the recent explosion in the urban literature of work on gentrification, a classic instance of a residential strategy for conferring status. In sum, we would argue that residential location is the classification struggle par excellence.
CLASS, SPACE, AND RACE IN JOHANNESBURG
Johannesburg is an incredibly young city. It began as little more than a mining camp in 1886 and within a decade was thought to be the largest urban place in Southern Africa (Beavon, 2004) . By 1919, Johannesburg was producing an astounding 40% of the world's gold. Its subsequent metamorphosis from a mining city to a manufacturing city to a hub of financial and services activity has been nothing short of dizzying. But through all these stages, Johannesburg has been marked by a stark geographical divide. The early division of the south of the city for mining and the north for commercial and residential purposes continues to be the defining spatial feature of the city. As a direct expression of the racially inscribed class logic of the mining economy, this geographical divide was most starkly manifest in the concentration of the African population of mineworkers in a dormitory city that would become Soweto just south of the mining strip, and the growth of leafy suburbs such as Parktown and Houghton Estate as areas of white privilege just north of the commercial city center. Despite the subsequent decline of the mining sector, this spatial divide was reproduced and reinforced through apartheid policy. During the mid-20th century, manufacturing began to supplant mining as the city's dominant economic activity. Industrial development was concentrated to the east of the mining belt, just south of the CBD, moving opportunities for unskilled employment further from the townships in the southwestern part of the city (Beall, Crankshaw, & Parnell, 2002) . However, racially inscribed residential patterns remained unchanged as the introduction of official apartheid during this period maintained and reinforced the racial divide.
With the government's adoption of neoliberal economic policies in the 1970s, efforts to foster export-led industrial growth faltered, and instead South Africa saw reduced domestic manufacturing output and disinvestment among foreign firms (Beall et al., 2002) . Compounded by apartheidera trade sanctions and global economic downturns, the domestic manufacturing economy witnessed a sharp decline. In Johannesburg, this was accompanied by a simultaneous growth in the service economy, marking a shift from a Fordist to post-Fordist economy (Crankshaw & Parnell, 2004) . By 2004, the finance and service industries contributed about three and a half times as much to the city's total gross value added as manufacturing industries (South African Cities Network, 2006) . The forms of class restructuring associated with this post-Fordist shift have received significant attention in the literature. In the most influential argument, the move from manufacturing employment to a service economy drives an increasingly polarized class structure in which a large number of middleincome manufacturing jobs disappear while job growth takes place in either high-income financial and informational service positions or the low-wage jobs that service the needs of this growing professional class (Sassen, 2001 ). This post-Fordist class restructuring hollows out the middle-income group while increasing the ranks of the upper and lower ends of the occupational structure, resulting in class polarization. However, the extent to which this polarization is taking place in South Africa is up for debate.
In examining the growing number of routine white-collar jobs created by a similar process of deindustrialization in Cape Town, Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2008) find that the polarization hypothesis tends to be overstated. Their analysis shows that while manufacturing jobs are declining, they are largely being replaced by service positions with a similar income structure, suggesting that the lower end of the middle class is not necessarily being hollowed out in South Africa but is instead experiencing changes in the types of occupations in which its members are employed.
In Johannesburg, the transition from a manufacturing to a finance and service economy was intertwined with a shift in the city's pattern of spatial development. The city's postapartheid spatial form can be traced back to the 1970s when saturation of the downtown area and the adjacent suburbs drove developers north. In what Beavon has called the ''great trek to the northern suburbs '' (2004, p. 255) , all new office space, malls, and all of the CBD's luxury hotels migrated north, capped off by the JSE's relocation to Sandton in 2000. The pace of this shift accelerated with the demise of the apartheid regime. 4 As these developments catered to the upper end of the burgeoning service economy, the center of economic activity moved further away from the poor and working-class neighborhoods south of the city and toward the new middle-class growth nodes of the northern suburbs.
This shift toward a post-Fordist economy was also associated with racial changes in terms of class and residential patterns. Apartheid-era legislation effectively reserved access to white-collar and professional jobs for whites, whereas the ranks of mining and factory employees were largely comprised of underpaid blacks working in hazardous conditions. The shift to a service economy in the 1970s in Johannesburg began to slowly break down this strict racial segregation in terms of employment, even as the apartheid regime maintained political power (Crankshaw AU :9 , 1996). The new service economy increased the demand for routine white-collar workers beyond a level that could be supplied by the white labor force. Even prior to the end of apartheid, as demand for service sector employment outstripped the size of the white labor force, Africans were recruited to fill these positions and saw a limited amount of class mobility (Crankshaw, 1996) . This meant that the state needed to play an important role in educating blacks for employment in these positions, thus increasing the need for black teachers and health-care providers in the townships. These dynamics created the beginnings of a multiracial routine white-collar class. However, Crankshaw (1996) argues that under apartheid the upward mobility of blacks could only proceed to the extent that whites were moving up into more lucrative careers and demand for lower paying jobs exceeded the availability of whites to fill those positions, creating what he terms a ''floating color bar.'' With these economic changes and the easing of strict enforcement of apartheid residential restrictions, Johannesburg began to experience ''graying'' in particular areas of the city, such as Hillbrow, where blacks began to move into white neighborhoods (Morris, 1994) , which were better serviced, more prestigious, and more centrally located than the townships.
The de facto end of enforced segregation in the 1980s, the repeal of the Group Areas Act in 1991, and the end of white majority rule in 1994 saw more rapid changes in the racial composition of vast areas of the city. The CBD and surrounding areas flipped from majority white to majority black and boundary areas between the formerly white north and nonwhite south were increasingly settled by upwardly mobile Africans, coloreds, and Indians/Asians, while the wealthier segments of these racial groups began to move into some of the more upscale northern suburbs.
Postapartheid racial mixing in middle-class neighborhoods was likely hastened by policies such as Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) and affirmative action programs, which sought to deracialize the South African class structure (Southall, 2007; Naidoo, 2008) , thereby providing nonwhites the potential economic means to move from the townships into better-off communities. Evidence suggests that in the context of these programs, there has been a significant movement of blacks into the middle and upper middle class in South Africa with black Africans making up 29% of the middle class in 1994 and about 50% in 2000 (Garcia-Rivero, du Toit, & Kotze, 2003) . However, while BEE, which incentivizes black ownership of the commanding heights of the economy, has made progress in redistributing capital among nonwhites, it is argued that these benefits have been concentrated among a small group of politically connected elites (Southall, 2007) . At the same time, while affirmative action legislation such as the Employment Equity Act of 1998 has institutionalized efforts to create a more racially representative public service, it seems to have resulted in the concentration of Africans among the lower ranks as opposed to upper level management (Naidoo, 2008) . As the transition from Fordism reshapes how classes are constructed and postapartheid policies provide greater residential and class mobility to black South Africans, it is important to examine how the country's middle class has changed both spatially and racially.
DATA AND METHODS
Our examination of changes in the composition and distribution of the middle class in Johannesburg uses census data collected by Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) AU :10 . Using GIS software we are able to complement descriptive analyses of changes in the middle class with an examination of the spatial dynamics of these phenomena across the city. Data from the 1996 censusthe first complete postapartheid census -are compared with data from the 2001 census -the most recent. Most of the current literature on South African cities that relies on census data aggregates that data to the city level. Because we are interested in the spatial dynamics of middle-class formation, much of our analysis is conducted at the level of a census subplace, the South African equivalent of the census tract and the smallest unit for which the data are publically available in both years. In contrast to census tracts, South African subplaces are defined according to recognizable named neighborhoods.
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The measure of class used in this chapter follows a categorization based on occupational categories in the census. Our categorization is similar to that used by Crankshaw (2008; see Table 1 ), which includes managers, senior officials, professionals, associate professionals, and technicians as part of the middle class. In order to disaggregate the middle class and examine variation within the class itself, we have divided these occupational groups into two categories, (1) an upper middle class, which includes legislators, managers, senior officials, and professionals and (2) a middle middle class, which includes associate professionals and technicians. In addition to these groupings, we have created a lower middle-class category that includes clerk and service and sales occupations. A complete list of the occupations included in each category can be found in the appendix. As in any classification system, there is a certain amount of arbitrariness associated with defining occupations and clumping occupations into middleclass tiers. But our categorizations do follow the well-established sociological tradition in relational class analysis of differentiating class fractions by the degree and type of power and authority they enjoy in the class hierarchy. The upper middle class is constituted of occupations that carry significant power and authority over complex organizations, be they in the private or public sector. The middle middle class category consists of associate professionals who posses scarce credentials and enjoy significant returns to those credentials both in terms of income and authority. The lower middle class category consists of semiskilled white-collar workers who are substitutable, may not enjoy job protection, and find themselves at the bottom of the organizational hierarchy. The inclusion of this category is highly debated in the literature. Sassen (2001) and others treat these workers as semiskilled and low-income and argue that because their wages are lower than those of skilled manufacturing workers, the growth of this semiskilled service class points to increasing social polarization with deindustrialization. Goldthorpe (1997) on the other hand has explicitly categorized routine nonmanual workers as ''intermediate'' classes. For South Africa, BorelSaladin andCrankshaw (2008) provide clear evidence that refutes the social polarization thesis, showing that while semiskilled service work is increasing and manufacturing jobs are decreasing, wages in the service jobs are in fact as good as and even slightly better than for skilled manufacturing. We remain agnostic about whether semiskilled service workers are properly treated as part of the middle class or not. Clearly, while this class fraction must not be lumped in with managers and professionals, and indeed in class terms stands in a subservient position to these higher class fractions, they cannot be lumped into a traditional working-class category either. Our approach begins with the recognition that class categories are useful to the extent that they capture boundaries and divisions that correspond with other important variables. In the end, we chose to include the lower middle class in our analysis for two specific reasons. First, as Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2008) show, this class is indeed replacing the organized manufacturing class, which as Seekings and Nattrass have influentially argued was the mainstay of the black middle class at the end of apartheid (2005, Chap. 7). In income terms this class fraction is quite literally in the middle.
7 Second, as we shall see, not only is the size of this segment of the middle class growing rapidly, but it is also developing distinct characteristics. In racial terms, this is the most representative class in South Africa, more or less mirroring the overall racial distribution of the country and in Our analysis of the middle class in Johannesburg proceeds in two steps, both of which include a comparative examination of changes in class and spatial composition across time. First, using census data, we provide a general description of the various segments of the middle class across postapartheid Johannesburg. This includes examining the class composition of the city as a whole as well as the racial and economic demographics across each segment of the middle class. The second phase of analysis examines the spatial distribution of the middle class across the city.
TRANSFORMATION AND CLASS RESTRUCTURING IN POSTAPARTHEID JOHANNESBURG
The democratic transition in South Africa has been accompanied by two simultaneous transformations. The first is the end of the apartheid regime itself and the removal of all legally enforced measures of racial segregation as well as proactive measures by a black majority state with significant capacities to undo the legacies of apartheid. The second is accelerated economic transformation. South Africa has become far more integrated into the global economy, but the shift from a Fordist manufacturing economy to a service-dominated economy has accelerated. Both of these transformative processes had dramatic effects on South Africa's class structure and Johannesburg's social geography. The post-Fordist shift in the occupational structure of the city is highlighted in Table 1 , which shows that between the 1996 and 2001 censuses, employment in service and clerking occupations has increased, whereas employment in manufacturing (plant and machine operators and assemblers) and craft and trade occupations has declined. Table 1 provides the foundation for examining postapartheid patterns of change among Johannesburg's middle class throughout the rest of this chapter. As described previously, the upper middle class category used in this analysis is composed of the legislators, senior officials, and managers category as well as the professionals category. The middle middle class is composed of the technicians and associate professionals and the lower middle class includes the clerks and service and sales occupations. Table 2 shows that between 1996 and 2001, the size of the middle class in Johannesburg grew both in raw numbers as well as proportionate to the To evaluate the distributive implications of these changes in the class structure, we use census data to examine the average monthly income for each of these middle-class segments in Johannesburg in both years.
8 Using 2001 census data for Johannesburg, Fig. 1 provides an indication of the gap between different middle-class fractions and supports Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw's (2008) argument that lower middle-class incomes are comparable to if not higher than the incomes of manufacturing jobs. 
Race and Class
With the collapse of apartheid and the rise to power of the ANC AU :11 , the state has played an active role in fostering the growth of a black middle class through BEE and affirmative action programs. Both of these programs offer the potential to overcome the floating color bar by creating space for blacks in the upper levels of the class structure as well as incentivizing nonwhite employment throughout the middle class. While it is difficult to gauge the impact of these policies, shifts in the racial composition of public sector employees have been decisive. For example, between 1993 and 2003, the percentage of Africans in the national civil service rose from 41 to 63, whereas the percentage of whites dropped from 38 to 23 (Southall, 2007, p. 7) . It is important, however, to more closely examine the degree to which each segment of the middle class has experienced racial change. Tables 3-5 show that between AU :12 1996 and 2001, the racial composition of the middle class in Johannesburg is changing significantly, but this change is occurring at different rates within each middle-class segment.
Within the upper middle class, nonwhites make up a substantial portion of the population (44.79% in 1996 and 43.81% in 2001) . Between 1996 and 2001, the proportion of Indians, in particular, increases dramatically. While increasing in raw numbers, the African portion of this class segment decreases proportionately between 1996 and 2001, 10 whereas whites and coloreds show a slight increase (see Table 3 ). The absolute increase in the numbers of the white upper middle class is quite surprising, especially given the well-documented phenomenon of white flight abroad. The ability of whites to maintain and even improve their position at the top of the class hierarchy points to their accumulated advantages in cultural and educational capital, but also suggests that state efforts to deracialize the upper middle class have either not been as aggressive or as successful as often argued.
11 Overall, this underscores a logic of ''displacement of the structure of distributions'' that Bourdieu (1984, p. 165) emphasized as central to classification struggles -as a subordinate group moves up the hierarchy of positions, the position itself is devalorized as the dominant group moves up. As seen in Table 4 , it is among the middle middle class that the most significant change in the percent of the population that is African occurs. Here the African portion of the population shows an increase of almost 11 percentage points. There are also smaller increases in the percentage of this class segment that is colored and Indian, accompanied by a relatively large decline in the percent white, making this category a key site of racial change.
Finally, Table 5 shows that significant racial change is also occurring within the lower middle class. Here, the percent African is increasing by almost five percentage points. At the same time, this category is seeing a dramatic decline in the percent white.
These findings suggest that, while the size of the African upper middle class is larger than the African population of the middle middle class -as suggested by Garcia-Rivero et al. (2003) -this upper middle-class population shows a slight proportionate decline. Within the upper middle class, Indians are seeing the largest proportionate increases. It is within the middle and lower middle class that the most substantial growth of the African middle class is occurring.
Class and Space
Previous research suggests that the end of apartheid has brought about significant mobility of black South Africans into the middle class, which the data we have presented here largely support. While this dynamic has created a multiracial elite in South Africa, many have argued that it is also contributing to increased class polarization. If polarization has not played itself out in income terms as we showed earlier (the lower middle class is not earning less than the working class it has displaced), there is reason to believe that it has manifested itself spatially. With the decline of the mining and manufacturing industries located in the southern part of the city, jobs traditionally held by the residents of Soweto and white working-class communities are disappearing (Crankshaw, 2008) . The corresponding growth of the service economy has been centered on Sandton in the northern suburbs of Johannesburg and has been accompanied by a general decline in economic activity in the CBD (Beavon, 2004) . These dynamics have shifted nodes of employment further away from the traditional working-class communities toward the historically wealthy parts of the city (Beall et al., 2002) .
The degree to which residents across Johannesburg are segregated from one another on the basis of class can be estimated using the index of Table 6 presents the index of dissimilarity for each segment of the middle class in both 1996 and 2001. This provides a measure of the extent to which each segment of the middle class is separated from all other groups in the city. The closer the value is to 1, the higher the degree of segregation. This table shows that of the three middle-class groups, the upper middle class is the most segregated from the rest of the urban residents and experiences the largest increase in segregation between the 2 years, suggesting increased class enclavization. The middle middle class on the other hand is much more evenly distributed across the city and becomes slightly less segregated between the 2 years. Finally, the lower middle class experiences the lowest level of segregation in both years, although there is a slight increase in levels of segregation. The higher degree of self-segregation as one moves up the class hierarchy is precisely what the class reproduction literature predicts and a pattern that is well documented in other cases.
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But if Johannesburg confirms the general relationship of a strong correlation between class and space, the actual geography of class privilege is much more consolidated than is normally the case in class-divided cities.
GIS allows us to create maps of neighborhoods across the city and to in effect visualize patterns of class concentration and segregation. In order to familiarize the reader with the geography of the city, Fig. 2 labels key sites throughout the city.
Figs. 3-6 demonstrate the spatial AU :13 distribution of each segment of the middle class across Johannesburg.
13 Fig. 3 shows that over the relatively short span of 5 years, there have been dramatic and visible changes in the spatial distribution of the upper middle class in Johannesburg. While in 1996, this group lived predominantly in the wealthier northern suburbs of the city, there were still some pockets of upper middle-class communities in the southern part of the city, including in the township of Soweto. However, by 2001, the upper middle class became much more concentrated in the northern part of the city, particularly around the growing financial and service hub of Sandton. While the northern suburbs are becoming increasingly homogeneous in terms of class, there is evidence that they are becoming more racially diverse (Crankshaw, 2008 ). It appears that the upper middle-class residents from the townships have moved to the increasingly clustered upper middle-class communities in the wealthy northern suburbs, providing strong evidence of increased class segregation and retrenchment of the upper middle class in a pattern that is not necessarily racially determined. The magnitude of clustering of the upper middle class in the northern suburbs can be seen in the local indicators of spatial association (LISA) map in Fig. 4 . An LISA map is used to identify clusters by comparing a given Fig. 4 shows that in both 1996 and 2001, there are obvious clusters of communities with a high percentage of residents in the upper middle class relative to their neighbors in the northern part of the city, whereas clusters of low values can be seen in the southern part of the city. Between the two regions, a division can be seen where communities and their neighbors do not share values similar enough in terms of class composition to be considered a cluster. The magnitude of clustering can be estimated using the Moran's I statistic, which measures the correlation between neighborsthe higher the Moran's I, the greater the degree of clustering. In 1996, the Moran's I for Johannesburg was 0.67, indicating a high degree of clustering. By 2001, the value had increased to 0.72, indicating increased clustering of the upper middle class. The large high-high cluster in the north points to a solid block of upper middle-class retrenchment. The fact that this high-high cluster stands in such sharp contrast to and distance from the low-low 
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cluster provides stark evidence of not just the enclavization of the upper middle class but also its increased geographical defection from the rest of the city. Fig. 5 , which examines the spatial location of the middle middle class, suggests a more dispersed distribution. While middle middle class communities were mostly located in the northern suburbs in 1996, by 2001 communities in Soweto were seeing large increases in the percent of the population that was part of this segment of the middle class. Thus, while the upper middle class is likely leaving these parts of Soweto for wealthier parts of the city, their departure does not necessarily leave behind communities with fewer resources as Wilson (1987) has argued occurs in American cities. Instead, these communities are still seeing a growing middle middle class.
The growing middle class in the southern part of the city can also be seen in the spatial distribution of the lower middle class in Fig. 6 . This group is growing in size throughout Soweto -driven in large part by the increase of the sheer size of the black lower middle class -as well as in the transitional band between the southern suburbs and the wealthier northern suburbs. This transitional band is the site of many of the city's apartheid-era working-class white neighborhoods and provides affordable housing outside the townships for the upwardly mobile black middle and lower middle class. For those residents of Soweto who make their way into the lower middle class and chose to leave, this transitional band is much more economically accessible than the northern suburbs where housing prices tend to be significantly higher.
These maps illustrate the importance of disaggregating the middle class in order to better understand the spatial dynamics taking place within this group. Arguments about the dramatic polarization of the middle class neglect the diversity of dynamics within that group itself. Spatial class retrenchment is largely driven by the upper middle class rather than the middle and lower middle class. The upper middle class is becoming more enclavized, that is, spatially concentrated and geographically removed, which in turn implies the spatial fragmentation of the middle class. Table 7 further underscores this dynamic by examining the correlation between middle-class status and distance from Sandton, the financial and service hub of Johannesburg. This is in other words a spatial measure of the correspondence between class, residence, and post-Fordist economic activity. The correlation coefficients show a negative correlation between a community's distance from Sandton and the percent of that community's population that is upper and middle middle class, indicating that as distance from Sandton increases, the percent of the population in each community that is upper and middle middle class decreases, signaling a concentration of the upper and middle middle class in the northern suburbs. The correlation is much higher for the upper middle class, confirming that this class is spatially concentrated around the dominant pole of South Africa's new economy. Between the 2 years, this pattern is magnified for the upper middle class, while there is a significant decline in this effect among the middle middle class. From our earlier examination of the maps, we can infer that this in large part reflects the increasing numbers of middle middle class urban residents who live in Soweto. In contrast to these two middle-class segments, the further from Sandton a community is, the higher the percent of its population is in the lower middle class, a trend that increases across these 2 years. This suggests that the concentration of the lower middle class is moving away from the northern suburbs as evidenced by the increase in this group in Soweto. 14 Under the apartheid regime, basic services and infrastructure in Soweto were severely underdeveloped, and strict limitations were placed on the ability of Soweto's African residents to start businesses or occupy middle-and upper-income jobs, creating a poor and underresourced community. Given this legacy, a plausible case can be made that the shift to a post-Fordist economy that has taken place in Johannesburg has further exacerbated the limits to upward mobility for Sowetans. Specifically, the geographic location of service industry jobs in the northern part of the city may have created a spatial mismatch between Soweto's labor force and the location of employment opportunities. This reasoning has led Crankshaw (2008) , among others, to argue that as apartheid-era residential restrictions were removed and Soweto's upper middle class moved north at the same time that the city's economy became increasingly reliant on service jobs concentrated in the northern part of Johannesburg, Soweto was left behind. Table 8 shows that between 1996 and 2001, the occupational structure of Soweto has shifted along with the economy. Comparable to the city as a whole, there has been an increase in employment in occupations associated with the service economy and a corresponding decline in traditional manufacturing occupations. Despite this growth in the middle class, as Crankshaw (2008) and others (Seekings & Nattrass, 2005) point out, unemployment is a key feature in understanding changing class dynamics in South Africa. While the middle class has grown in Soweto, this growth is accompanied by increased unemployment, 15 suggesting that the types of economic transitions occurring among residents of Soweto are incredibly varied and more complicated than the mere ghettoization of the area. These changes in the occupational structure of Soweto have resulted in shifts within the middle class. As shown in Table 9 , the middle class in Soweto is growing, but this growth is taking place primarily within the middle and lower middle classes. Between 1996 and 2001, there is in fact a dramatic outmigration of professionals, lending support to the hypothesis that with the end of apartheid, upper middle-class Africans moved out of the townships and into the wealthier northern suburbs. At the same time, however, the population that remained saw upward mobility into the ranks of the middle and lower middle class. The growth of the middle middle class (technicians and associate professionals) is striking, and within the lower middle class the growth is entirely driven by the category of clerks, which represents the higher end of the income distribution within the lower middle class. In sum, Soweto has experienced a significant expansion of the middle of the middle class. This expansion in turn suggests that within certain pockets of Soweto, a transition is taking place from a ghetto -a residential area in which people are trapped -to an ethnic enclave, an area in which people from a single ethnic group chose to live. 16 This in turn points to the impact of postapartheid policies. First and maybe most importantly, following the end of apartheid, titles to government-owned houses in Soweto were transferred to their occupants, providing a key incentive to remain in the township.
Soweto
17 Second, as part of the Johannesburg government's commitment to addressing the service backlog in townships, Soweto has received significant investments of infrastructure and services, including electrification, improved access to water, and the paving of the townships roads.
Northern Suburbs
As the center of the growing service economy, the northern suburbs provide a stark contrast to Soweto. In order to more closely examine class dynamics within this part of the city, those subplaces that are part of the 2001 upper middle-class cluster identified in the map in Fig. 4 were examined as a whole. Table 10 shows that the largest difference between Soweto and the northern suburbs is at the higher end of the occupational structure. The northern suburbs see a positive increase in the proportion of professionals, whereas Soweto is seeing a large decline in this category between 1996 and 2001. This suggests that upward class mobility among the city's African population is reflected spatially as apartheid residential restrictions are lifted. While the increases in the upper end of the occupational structure are greater in the northern suburbs than Soweto, shifts in the middle of the occupational structure are relatively small, with a slight decline in technicians and associate professionals and only small increases in clerks and service and sales occupations relative to Soweto.
While in Soweto the middle and lower middle class are seeing substantial growth, as can be seen in Table 11 , it is the upper middle class that is growing in the northern suburbs. This growth coincides with a small decline compliment the originating urban cores, the northern suburbs have developed at the expense of the CBD. 18 Johannesburg's past imparts to this process of ''separate development'' its own internal dynamic of social fragmentation. There is in fact a double-enclavization at work. Not only is the north becoming an enclave of upper middle class privilege increasingly disconnected from the rest of the city, it is itself being parcellized into securitized enclaves. Increasing perceptions of insecurity and fear of crime have driven the middle and upper classes into gated communities characterized by high levels of security and limited social interaction beyond the neighborhood walls (Lemanski, 2006) . A large number of the older suburbs have established security checkpoints on roads, erected booms, and in general tried to patrol the boundaries of the neighborhood. Almost all new developments in the north are gated communities, and business parks, entertainment complexes, and malls are all highly securitized. Czegle´dy concludes his survey of the architectural features of these new spaces by remarking that ''the distinctly architectonic features of the post-apartheid city increasingly symbolize entrenched divisions between private and public life and between the individual and the state' ' (2003, p. 22) . There is also some evidence that despite the general patterns of deracialization of the northern suburbs, new patterns of racial segregation are emerging. Jurgens, Gnad, and Bahr (2003) found the new developments they studied to be quite racially homogenous and argue that price differentials and images of individual residential areas are steering different ethnic groups into different developments. Reviewing the general climate of insecurity and fear that has become a pervasive part of life in Johannesburg, Bremner comes to a stark conclusion: ''Johannesburg today is a city of walls, substitutes for the invisible walls of apartheid through which the Other was kept in its place'' (Bremner, 2004, p. 464) .
In addition to concerns with security, this upper middle-class enclavization is likely a product of status preservation. Interviews with residents reveal that members of prestigious professions are often encouraged by employers and real estate agents to live in the exclusive northern suburbs. This occupational clustering and residential enclavization can be directly tied to a range of assets that are critical to upper middle-class reproduction. The northern suburbs contain the vast majority of the city's high-end malls, entertainment facilities (with the notable exception of soccer stadia), private clubs, and parks. Most significantly, the bulk of the city's best schools are located in this area. Almost all of the city's prestigious private schools are in the northern suburbs, but even more strikingly the area's public schools are almost uniformly high-performing. Thus, in 2001, schools that were located in the upper middle-class cluster had an average fail rate on South Africa's high school exam of 2.48%, and only a single school in the entire region had a failure rate that was above the Soweto average of 11.36%.
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The northern suburbs are clearly becoming more class exclusive, but they are also becoming much more powerful. Thus, in the northern suburbs, the proportion of legislators, senior officials, and managers category increases more dramatically than in Soweto, the traditional home of the ANC leadership. Though we can't break down these numbers, all the evidence would suggest that much of this increase has been driven by the migration of the elite political class into the northern suburbs. Most prominent ANC officials live in the north, and even at lower ends of the party there is a clear status premium on living in these neighborhoods. In conducting fieldwork in townships across the city, a common complaint we heard from residents is that their ward councilors (elected officials) have all moved to Sandton (Heller, 2003) . The increased geographical concentration of state and party elites in and around Sandton reinforces arguments made by Southall (2004) and others that state policies of BEE have helped forge a black bourgeoisie through closer state-private sector ties.
CONCLUSION
Since the collapse of apartheid, dramatic shifts have occurred within Johannesburg's middle class. In contrast to the social polarization thesis (Sassen, 2001) , the evidence presented here suggests that the middle class was not hollowed out but instead grew in the years immediately following the end of apartheid. This period saw a significant increase in the size of the middle class overall, with substantial growth among the service, sales, and clerk occupations that comprise the lower middle class. As Borel-Saladin and Crankshaw (2008) point out, these jobs are often well paid and are not necessarily associated with a decline in income relative to manufacturing jobs. In terms of income and occupational structure then, there is clear evidence that Johannesburg's economic transformation is producing a large, and racially diverse, middle class. This image lends support to official discourses that trumpet the middle class as the harbinger of a new, prosperous, and diverse South Africa. But when one disaggregates the middle class, a more complex picture emerges. Our findings are summarized in Table 12 .
In the period we examine, the upper middle class expanded rapidly. The increase in the category of legislators, managers, and senior officials marks the expansion of the state while the rise in professionals reflects Johannesburg's increased role as a services and information hub and as a regional world city, the entrepot for foreign capital entering Southern Africa (Beavon, 2004) . However, the racial composition of this class has changed only marginally, and whites have largely maintained their dominant position despite BEE and aggressive policies of affirmative action. 20 Most dramatic of all, this class has entrenched itself in the northern suburbs, including both the traditional elite suburbs on the edge of the CBD and the gated greenfield developments surrounding Sandton and pushing out northwards in Midrand. This class has in fact become so residentially concentrated that it has all but abandoned the southern half of the city, and it is now possible to identify a large continuous upper middle-class enclave along the northern half of the M1 (the principle north-south highway).
Lower and middle middle class formation has followed markedly different patterns. The middle middle class -associate professionals and technicianshas experienced much more significant deracialization. This class tends to enjoy job protection and high rates of unionization and occupies a very comfortable position in South Africa. The middle middle class has become spatially less concentrated and can be found in the north as well as in the south of the city. The lower middle class, which consists of low-skilled white-collar workers, has grown dramatically. In terms of income, this class occupies the very middle of the South African class structure and more or less mirrors the racial distribution in South Africa. Residentially, it has become much more concentrated in the southern part of the city. Overall, the spatial dynamics of class restructuring are clear cut. As our cluster analysis showed rather dramatically, the city has quite literally been split in two. The north has become an even larger and more continuous enclave of privilege than under apartheid. The formation of this enclave moreover reveals a near perfect homology of the structural and reproductive dimensions of class. Thus, the geographical reconfiguration of the postFordist economy around the financial and corporate headquarter functions of Sandton, and the high-tech cluster of Midrand has been accompanied by the consolidation of a totalized suburb of integrated upper middle-class consumption, entertainment, schooling, and housing. If Johannesburg was always a class and race-divided city, its spatial hierarchy has now been finetuned to include the middle class. Our spatial analysis reveals that as a neighborhood's distance from Sandton increases, the presence of the upper middle class declines and the presence of the middle and lower classes increases. In sum, the middle class is fragmenting, and this dynamic is largely being driven by the enclavization of upper echelons.
What has transpired in Johannesburg in the postapartheid period carries some important lessons for our understanding of class formation and social inequality. The advent of majority rule in South Africa raised the hope that the legacies of apartheid could be reversed and that the city in particular could be transformed. Working with what are by any developing world standards significant resources and high state capacity, the ANC has aggressively pursued policies to deracialize the occupational structure and redistribute public resources, including measures to improve basic service delivery and infrastructure in townships. The impact of these interventions can be seen in Soweto where the size of the middle class has grown significantly. This has been driven on the one hand by affirmative action policies -and probably most decisively by the deracialization of the civil service -as well as the policy of providing titles to township homes but also by significant upgrading of Soweto's infrastructure that has made the township far more attractive to the lower and middle middle class. In this sense, as Soweto has diversified in class terms and not only retained but grown its lower and middle middle class, particular areas have become more of an ethnic enclave than an excluded ghetto.
But the impact of public interventions to reverse the legacies of apartheid appears to pale in comparison to the effects of middle-class restructuring. Over the past two decades, the combined effects of business investment and residential development have relocated resources from the center of the city to its northern suburbs and beyond. The four fields that are critical to middle-class reproduction -employment, housing, consumption, and education (Robson & Butler, 2001, p. 72 ) -have become increasingly concentrated and enclavized. Thus even as public policies have sought to dismantle inherited inequalities, class practices have effectively segregated opportunities. Upper middle-class privilege has not only become more entrenched but has also been hived off from the rest of the middle class. Crankshaw (1996a Crankshaw ( , 1996b ; Lemanski (2004) ; Marcuse & van Kempen (2000) ; Massey (1996) . NOTES 1. Beavon (2004) has noted that Johannesburg has a metropolitan area greater in areal extent than Mexico City that was generally regarded as the world's largest urban place in the mid-1980s (241).
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